Buy New Products From China [BEST]
Numerous Chinese millionaires were minted as recycling businesses started and blossomed. Sure, they paid for the world's plastic and paper trash, but they made far more money from processing it and selling the resulting raw materials.
buy new products from china
In 1995, Zhang Yin started a paper recycling company in China called Nine Dragons. She would become China's first female billionaire. China wanted scrap paper and plastic to recycle into more products, and Yin seized the market.
China had plenty of capacity to handle plastics and lots of cheap laborers to sort the recyclable materials from the nonrecyclable. By 2016, the U.S. was exporting almost 700,000 tons a year to China alone. Overall, China imported 7 million tons from around the world.
In fact, Bourque actually tracked some of the plastic scrap from his operation in Berkeley. In 2016, he buried a GPS transponder in one of his bales of paper and plastic waste from the Ecology Center. Waste brokers bought it. He followed the transponder's electronic signals to a town in China. Bourque then contacted local residents to document what happened to it. They reported to Bourque what they saw.
Meanwhile, shipments of plastic waste to other Southeast Asian countries have skyrocketed. Exports from the U.S. to Thailand jumped almost 7,000 percent in one year. Malaysia's went up several hundred percent. Those numbers dropped in 2018 after those countries cut back on imports.
In the end, China bought only 58 percent of the US exports it had committed to purchase under the agreement, not even enough to reach its import levels from before the trade war. Put differently, China bought none of the additional $200 billion of exports Trump's deal had promised.
However, signing something that was problematic, if not unrealistic, from the start, shows some degree of bad faith on both sides. After two years of escalating tariffs and rhetoric about economic decoupling, the deal did little to reduce the uncertainty discouraging the business investment needed to restart US exports. Most of Trump's tariffs remained in effect, especially on inputs, raising costs to US companies. And by failing to negotiate the removal of China's retaliatory tariffs, the agreement may have funneled any Chinese demand for US exports away from China's private sector toward its state-owned enterprises.
The phase one agreement committed China to increase its purchases of certain US goods and services in 2020 and 2021 by at least $200 billion over 2017 levels (figure 1). China agreed to buy at least $227.9 billion of US exports in 2020 and $274.5 billion in 2021, for a total of $502.4 billion over the two years. The agreement also established legal commitments for a defined set of manufacturing, services, agricultural, and energy products, as examined below.
A number of factors affected energy sales. Energy was one sector where failing to meet the obligations may be partially explained by (knowable) capacity constraints. According to Bloomberg, for example, in January 2020, the US industry informed the Trump administration that it lacked the capacity to fulfill the commitments. (The returns to export capacity expansion may also have been uncertain, if long-term US policy involves pressuring China to decarbonize by cutting reliance on coal-fired power plants.) The fact that the commitments were written in value (dollars) and not volume (e.g., barrels of oil) terms also meant that they were not immune from price shocks. Crude oil prices briefly turned negative in April 2020, depressing the value of sales; by the fall of 2021, they had doubled from one year earlier, over-inflating the value of sales.
The global economy recovered in 2021, with China's economic growth rebounding to 8.1 percent and the United States growing 5.7 percent. Chinese goods imports from the world were 31 percent higher in 2021, and US goods and services exports to the world finished up 18 percent.
Finally, moderate price inflation might actually have helped China meet purchase commitments, as the agreement was written in value (not volume) terms. According to data from CPB World Trade Monitor, Chinese import and US export prices fell in early 2020 before quickly recovering. By March 2021, Chinese import prices were 10 percent higher than in December 2019; by October 2021, they were 22 percent higher. US export prices were 7 percent higher in March 2021 than December 2019; by October 2021, they were 16 percent higher.
The trade war was also costly to the US economy through the impact of the US tariffs. Numerous economic studies have documented that the effect of the tariffs was to raise prices and hurt American consumers and companies buying imported inputs, harming American competitiveness by reducing employment and sales.  Some sectors and workers may have benefited from the US tariffs, but those gains were more than offset by losses by others, resulting in overall damage to the US economy.
One start to the new strategy has involved the United States working with other major economies. The most advanced to date is its effort with the European Union, including through the Trade and Technology Council. Identifying what, specifically, the US and EU find costly about the Chinese approach is needed in order to begin to craft and ultimately negotiate new rules. Even if policymakers agree that multilateral purchase commitments must be part of a long-term solution to China's trade relationship with the world, they should learn the right lessons from the US experiences under the phase one agreement.
5. When briefing journalists on the details of the phase one agreement in December 2019, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer refused to release details of product-specific targets more disaggregated than manufacturing, services, agriculture, and energy, stating 'Our judgment is that to make those things public, the subcategories could have a market impact, which is not in anyone's interest. But we'll have them and we'll keep them in the classified document' (Bown 2021, p. 30). The 2020 and 2021 targets presented here for the 17 goods products and 5 services subsectors are only estimates, defined as in Appendix Table 2.
14. Article 6.2.3 of the agreement states, "The Parties project that the trajectory of increases in the amounts of manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products, and services purchased and imported into China from the United States will continue in calendar years 2022 through 2025."
On February 14, 2020, the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China: Phase One went into effect. Under the deal, China agreed to expand purchases of certain US goods and services by $200 billion for the two-year period from January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2021, above 2017 baseline levels.
Over the course of 2020-21, this PIIE Chart tracked China's monthly purchases of US goods only covered by the agreement. (Because services data were only available at a considerable time lag and not at the monthly frequency, they were not reported in these updates.) Following the text of the legal agreement, tracking goods purchases required relying on data from both Chinese customs (China's imports) and the US Census Bureau (US exports). The chart then compared those goods purchases with the legal agreement's annual commitments, prorated on a monthly basis based on seasonal adjustments, above two baseline scenarios (see methodology section IV below). As set out in the legal agreement, one 2017 baseline scenario allowed for use of US export statistics and the other allows for Chinese import statistics.
From January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2021, China committed to purchase no less than an additional $162.1 billion of covered goods from the United States relative to these 2017 baselines (figure 2). Defining the 2017 baseline using US export statistics implied a two-year purchase commitment of $352.2 billion. Defining the 2017 baseline using Chinese import statistics implied a two-year commitment of $380.5 billion.
From January 2020 through December 2021, China's total imports of covered products from the United States were $235.3 billion (figure 2, red in panel a) and US exports to China were $210.1 billion (blue in panel a). In the end, China's purchases of all covered products reached 62 percent (Chinese imports) or 60 percent (US exports) of the phase one commitment.
For covered agricultural products, China committed to an additional $32.0 billion of purchases combined over 2020 and 2021 above 2017 levels, implying a two-year commitment of $80.1 billion (Chinese imports, panel b) and $73.9 billion (US exports, panel c). From January 2020 through December 2021, China's imports of covered agricultural products from the United States were $61.4 billion and US exports were $61.1 billion. In the end, China's purchases of covered agricultural products reached 77 percent (Chinese imports) or 83 percent (US exports) of the phase one commitment.
For covered manufactured products, China committed to an additional $77.7 billion of purchases combined over 2020 and 2021 above 2017 levels, implying a two-year commitment of $234.4 billion (Chinese imports) and $210.7 billion (US exports). From January 2020 through December 2021, China's imports of covered manufactured products from the United States were $142.8 billion and US exports to China were $124.0 billion. In the end, China's purchases of covered manufactured products reached 61 percent (Chinese imports) or 59 percent (US exports) of the phase one commitment.
For covered energy products, China committed to an additional $52.4 billion of purchases combined over 2020 and 2021 above 2017 levels, implying a two-year commitment of $66.0 billion (Chinese imports) and $67.7 billion (US exports). From January 2020 through December 2021, China's imports of covered energy products from the United States were $31.1 billion and US exports to China were $25.0 billion. In the end, China's purchases of covered energy products reached 47 percent (Chinese imports) or 37 percent (US exports) of the phase one commitment. 041b061a72